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Severe Neurological Impairment: 
Legal Aspects of Decisions to Reduce Care 
H. kchard Beresford, MD, JD 
Decisions to reduce care for patients with severe neurological impairment may raise legal questions. The laws of most 
states now authorize physicians to stop care for those who have suffered irreversible cessation of all functions of the 
brain (“brain death). Where state law is not explicit, it is nevertheless probably lawful to regard brain death as death 
for legal purposes so long as currently accepted criteria are satisfied. Several courts have ruled that it is lawful to reduce 
care for patients in vegetative states, but have prescribed differing standards and procedures for implementing such 
decisions. The issue of whether parents can authorize physicians to reduce care for neurologically impaired children is 
the focus of current litigation. Implicit in this litigation is the question of how severe neurological impairment must be 
before parents and physicians may lawfully agree to reduce care. For severely impaired but not vegetative adults, there 
is some legal authority to justify certain decisions to reduce care. The issue of whether withholding feeding from a 
severely demented patient with life-threatening medical problems constitutes criminal behavior is now being consid- 
ered by a state supreme court. 
Beresford HR. Severe neurological impairment: legal aspects of decisions to reduce care. 
Ann Neurol 15:409-414, 1984 
Decisions to reduce care for patients suffering from 
severe neurological impairment may present difficult 
ethical and legal problems. Courts that have ruled on 
the lawfulness of these decisions have had little guid- 
ance from legislation or judicial precedent. But despite 
sharp debate about some rulings, a rough judicial con- 
sensus has emerged. It can be stated as follows: If 
physicians have determined that a patient has no 
reasonable prospect of attaining cognitive or other 
nonvegetative functions of the brain, and if physicians 
and the patient’s informed legal representatives agree 
that reducing care is proper, then life-sustaining care 
may lawfully be withdrawn or withheld. There is no 
such consensus about what is lawful for less severely 
impaired patients, nor is there broad general agree- 
ment on what procedures must be followed to validate 
decisions to reduce care. This review considers 
neurological impairments that may justify reducing 
care, and discusses the impact of law on how decisions 
to reduce care are implemented. 
Neurological Impairments That May Justify 
Reducing Care 
Brain Death 
The view that death of the brain is the equivalent of the 
death of the person has slowly gained acceptance. A 
majority of state legislatures and several courts in states 
without legislation on the subject have declared that, 
for legal purposes, an irreversible loss of all brain func- 
tions constitutes death 128, 351. In these states, a med- 
ical determination that generally accepted criteria of 
brain death have been met readily justifies stopping all 
forms of care. Even when the family of a patient desires 
that treatment continue until cardiac function ceases, a 
physician may elect to stop treatment. An Illinois ap- 
pellate court has recently decided that physicians are 
entitled to remove a patient from a respirator once they 
have diagnosed brain death and may disregard a fami- 
ly’s wishes that it be maintained until cardiac arrest 
occurs 1261. 
In states with neither legislation nor an explicit judi- 
cial ruling, it is probably legally justifiable to stop care 
on diagnosis of brain death. The common law principle 
that death occurs when a competent physician diag- 
noses it would seem to apply. Thus, in a recent appel- 
late decision in New York (which has no brain death 
legislation) the court upheld a jury’s finding that a crim- 
inal defendant who had caused medically diagnosed 
brain death was guilty of manslaughter {34}. When a 
physician is concerned about the lack of an explicit law 
or ruling on brain death, he or she may seek approval 
for a decision to stop care from a hospital review body. 
If it seems likely that the decision will provoke legal 
controversy, obtaining a court order is prudent. 
Regardless of state law, the essential question con- 
cerning brain death is whether generally accepted med- 
ical criteria have been fully satisfied. In litigation about 
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brain death, disputes have centered on the adequacy of 
the testing that led to the diagnosis. For example, in 
homicide prosecutions defendants have asserted that 
the physicians who allegedly misdiagnosed brain death 
in fact killed the victims by removing them from respi- 
rators [34, 431. Although this tactic has failed, its use 
highlights the importance of documenting both the cri- 
teria used for diagnosing brain death and the results of 
testing (including a description of the methods and re- 
sults of testing for apnea) [34}. 
Vegetative States 
The widely publicized Quinlan case [23] involved a 
young woman who had been vegetative for many 
months following treatment of an acute encephalopa- 
thy of undefined cause. Her examining physicians all 
agreed that there was little hope for neurological recov- 
ery. After the family learned of this grim prognosis, her 
father sought, against her physician’s objections, to 
have her removed from a respirator. Although medical 
testimony at the trial indicated that she would not 
necessarily die if the respirator were removed [22), the 
focus of the litigation was on her “right to die.” The 
New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately determined that 
she had such a right, that it was of constitutional dimen- 
sions, and that her father could exercise it on her be- 
half. Since the Quinlan decision, courts in Delaware 
[42), New York [28}, Ohio [25},  and Washington [271 
have decided that patients in chronic vegetative states 
have a constitutional or common law right to the with- 
drawal of respirators or other life-sustaining measures. 
The patient in the Ohio case also had incapacitating 
motor neuron disease at the time of the cardiac arrest 
that left her in a vegetative state. 
A recent ruling by a California appellate court {4] is 
particularly noteworthy because it involved an unpre- 
cedented criminal prosecution of physicians. At issue 
was the lawfulness of withdrawing care from a man who 
had sustained severe brain injury from a cardiac arrest 
during elective surgery. After a neurological consulta- 
tion, his two physicians informed his family that he had 
a poor prognosis for neurological recovery, and on au- 
thorization from the family removed him from a respi- 
rator. When the patient did not die, fluid and nutri- 
tional therapy were withheld. He died several days 
later. Autopsy findings included diffuse and multifocal 
encephalomalacia, dehydration, and pneumonia. 
At a preliminary hearing before a magistrate, all 
medical witnesses agreed that the patient had sustained 
substantial brain damage before any treatment was 
withheld. However, the prosecution’s medical experts 
indicated that there was some uncertainty about the 
degree of recovery of neurological functions that 
would have been possible if the patient had received 
maximal treatment. The magistrate nonetheless found 
no “probable cause” for prosecuting the physicians, and 
dismissed charges of murder and conspiracy to commit 
murder {32}. 
A superior court judge reinstated the charges {331, 
but they were then dismissed by a district appellate 
court {4]. It adopted an “omission” theory of homicide, 
under which a physician could be found guilty for fail- 
ing to perform a duty to a particular patient if the 
omission caused the patient’s death. The court inter- 
preted the medical evidence to indicate that the patient 
“had suffered severe brain damage, leaving him in a 
vegetative state, which was likely to be permanent.” 
For such a patient the court found no duty to continue 
what was likely to be ineffective treatment, even if the 
physician knew that withholding treatment would 
cause his death. In other words, the court seems to be 
saying that physicians have no legal duty to sustain the 
lives of irreversibly vegetative patients. The prosecu- 
tion announced that it would not take an appeal to the 
state’s highest court, leaving uncertain the weight of 
this case as a precedent in other courts in California #or 
elsewhere. 
Several courts have thus decided that the law does 
not require physicians to prolong the lives of hope- 
lessly vegetative patients. Where they have differed is 
on what procedures must be followed before care is 
actually reduced. For example, the Quinlan decision 
[23] would require that a hospital committee review 
the medical determination of prognosis before life- 
supporting measures are withdrawn, while the Storar 
decision 1283 indicates that if there is “clear and con- 
vincing” evidence that the neurological prognosis is 
hopeless and that reducing care would accord with the 
patient’s wishes, care may be reduced without further 
oversight or review. 
These nuances aside, the matter that most concerns 
the physician is the reliability of the determination that 
one who is in a vegetative state will remain that way. 
Law does not require absolute or statistical certainty 
before a prognosis is deemed acceptable as a basis for 
decision making. But the specific level of certainty re- 
quired is not clear. Courts generally will accept into 
evidence an opinion based on “reasonable medical cer- 
tainty” or some similar standard C91. Then they weigh 
the opinions and decide what effect to give them. If a 
physician’s determination of a hopeless prognosis is 
based upon a careful neurological examination, a re- 
view of published relevant studies, and consultation 
with those who may be more knowledgeable or experi- 
enced, then such a prognosis can be offered with “rea- 
sonable medical certainty” and may serve as legal 
justification for reducing care for a vegetative patient. 
Congenital Encepbalopathies 
Each year substantial numbers of children are born 
with neurological impairments. These vary in severity 
and their full extent may not be appreciated for many 
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years. While some of these children may be classified as 
vegetative, more commonly they have diminished cog- 
nitive or neocortical functions and are labeled as men- 
tally retarded. They may or may not have other 
* neurological impairments, skeletal deformities, or 
anomalies in other systems. When severe impairments 
are present and parents and physicians agree that the 
outlook for a life of reasonable quality (however that 
term is defined) for the child is bleak, physicians have 
withheld life-supporting care { I ,  111. 
Actions of this nature have not, until recently, been 
subjects of much legal inquiry. One explanation is the 
law’s presumption that parents act in the best interests 
of their children [lb, 361. From this has followed the 
view that the state, through the operation of its legal 
institutions, should not interfere in decisions parents 
make with respect to the medical care of their children. 
The state may intervene only if it can establish, usu- 
ally in the context of neglect or child abuse proceed- 
ings, that parental conduct clearly threatens the welfare 
of a child. Thus, a New York court ordered surgery for 
an infant with meningomyelocele after finding that the 
parents’ rejection of surgery constituted “neglect,” 
since the child might expect a “relatively normal life” 
after surgery {2). Similarly, a Massachusetts court or- 
dered chemotherapy for a child with a curable form of 
leukemia over the parents’ objections, since the med- 
ical evidence was that the child would certainly die 
without treatment [lo]. But a New York court found 
no parental neglect in the case of a child with Hodg- 
kin’s disease whose parents had rejected conventional 
therapy and chosen a licensed physician who pre- 
scribed laetrile and “metabolic therapy” [27).  This last 
decision illustrates the power of the legal presumption 
that parents act for the good of their children. 
The federal government has recently sought to con- 
strain decisions by parents and physicians to reduce 
care for children with neurological and other impair- 
ments. Its approach has been to interpret certain fed- 
eral statutes [8, 391 that provide for financial support to 
health care institutions as forbidding decisions that 
either “discriminate” against handicapped children or 
amount to child abuse. While the statutes themselves 
do not expressly forbid parents from choosing to re- 
duce or withhold care from their children, regulations 
proposed under these laws empower the government 
to withdraw funding from hospitals or other health care 
institutions that tolerate allegedly discriminatory or 
abusive care f l 3 ,  14, 151. The threat of this sanction 
presumably would cause health care institutions to en- 
sure compliance with federal standards for the care of 
children. 
The government’s first major effort in this direction 
was thwarted. The Department of Health and Human 
Services proposed regulations, under a federal rehabili- 
tation statute 1391, that declared that the statute is vio- 
lated when treatment is withheld from a neurologically 
or otherwise handicapped child solely because of the 
child’s handicap 187. The regulations required health 
care institutions to post notices stating that “discrimina- 
tory denial of food or customary medical care” to hand- 
icapped children is unlawful, and established a “hot- 
line” procedure for reporting suspected violations that 
would then trigger federal investigations. A federal 
court invalidated these regulations because they had 
been issued without prior public notice or opportunity 
for affected parties to comment, as required by a fed- 
eral administrative procedure act [ 13. New regulations 
were promptly proposed, this time allowing for public 
comment, but they have not yet been finalized [ 151. 
New York‘s highest court recently barred a private 
citizen, unrelated to the parents or health care provid- 
ers, from obtaining a court order requiring life- 
prolonging surgery for a newborn with severe 
neurological impairments 1461. The court held that 
only the state child protective service or a person au- 
thorized by a court had the standing to seek such an 
order. The federal government then sought to obtain 
the child’s medical records to determine if the child had 
been the subject of “discrimination.” A federal district 
judge denied this request 1441, finding that there was 
no evidence of discrimination. The government has 
appealed this ruling. 
Other Conditions 
There are two other broadly defined groups of 
neurologically impaired patients for whom reductions 
in care may be considered. One consists of persons 
who are neither comatose nor vegetative but who have 
severe, irreversible neurological impairment and are 
incapable of making decisions for themselves. An ex- 
ample is a person in the late stages of Alzheimer’s 
disease. The other group consists of persons who are 
neurologically impaired but whose cognitive functions 
are intact enough to enable them to decide for them- 
selves how much care they prefer. An example is a 
person with incapacitating motor neuron disease or 
with quadriplegia after a cervical spinal cord injury. In 
the legal sense, persons in the first group are incompe- 
tent; those in the second group are competent. 
There is limited judicial support for permitting phy- 
sicians to reduce care for certain incompetent non- 
vegetative patients. An intermediate appellate court in 
Massachusetts held that an order not to resuscitate an 
elderly patient with Alzheimer’s disease and diffuse 
cardiovascular disease did not require prior judicial ap- 
proval if attending physicians and family agreed that 
the order was appropriate 1203. This finding har- 
monizes with the view of the California court in the 
Barber case {4] that law does not impose on physicians 
a duty to sustain life in all neurologically impaired pa- 
tients. By contrast, an intermediate appellate court in 
Beresford: Legal Aspects of Reducing Care 411 
New Jersey recently reversed a lower court’s permis- 
sive ruling [lS] and suggested that removal of a feeding 
tube from a severely demented but not vegetative 
woman with life-threatening medical problems might 
constitute a criminal homicide 1171. An appeal of this 
decision to the New Jersey Supreme Court is pending. 
New York‘s highest court ruled, in the Storar litigation 
1281, that the mother of an incompetent adult was not 
empowered to prevent his receiving blood transfu- 
sions, even though he was terminally ill with metastatic 
cancer. His physicians believed that the transfusions 
made him more comfortable. 
As a general legal principle, all persons possess a 
right to refuse medical treatment, even if they will die 
or suffer great harm as a consequence 121, 24, 30,411. 
Indeed, courts have invoked this right as the basis for 
permitting surrogates to choose to reduce care for 
neurologically impaired incompetent patients 16, 23, 
291. It would seem to follow, therefore, that a physi- 
cian has no legal duty to coerce a competent neurolog- 
ically impaired patient into receiving life-sustaining or 
other treatment and does not risk civil or criminal lia- 
bility by acceding to an informed patient’s unequivocal 
refusal of treatment. Moreover, forcing treatment 
might constitute assault and battery 117). 
Implementing Decisions to Reduce Care 
Once a physician has diagnosed a neurological impair- 
ment that may justify reducing care, the question 
whether and how to accomplish this will arise. Most 
states now have neither authorizing legislation nor a 
pertinent judicial decision. Current “living will” and 
related laws 137, 38)  offer a basis for reducing the care 
of those few patients who qualify under the terms of 
the statutes, but do not resolve the problem of the 
patient who sustained severe neurological incapacity 
before any consideration was given to reducing care. In a 
few states (e.g., New Jersey, Massachusetts, Delaware, 
Ohio, and New York), judicial decisions (6, 25, 28, 29, 
42 )  offer guidance on how to proceed, particularly for 
the physician who desires advance assurance that a de- 
cision to reduce care will not trigger a legal imbroglio. 
If there is no such guidance, the physician is left with a 
choice among abandoning any thoughts of reducing 
care, acting in accordance with perceived medical 
norms, or seeking formal institutional approval of a 
decision to reduce care. The following sections de- 
scribe some “models” for decision making, derived 
from recent judicial decisions. 
Traditional Medical Model 
Testimony of physicians in the Quinkzn case portrayed 
a medical tradition of adjusting levels of care to fit the 
condition of hopelessly ill patients 122, 231. This in- 
cludes withholding life-prolonging treatment when the 
only effect of treatment is to extend a life of great 
misery or incapacity. Decisions of this nature are ar- 
rived at slowly and are implemented only after exten- 
sive discussions with the closest available members of a 
patient’s family. While medical consultations are sought 
to assure reliability of diagnosis and prognosis, the par- 
ticipation of persons other than family and attending 
physicians is not invited. Because the process is infor- 
mal and nonlegalistic, the physician has no express 
guarantee that he or she is invulnerable to later legal 
attack. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in its Quinlan 
opinion (231, questioned the traditional model. The 
court considered that physicians have become so 
preoccupied with defensive concerns that they cannot 
make decisions in the best interests of patients. Thus, 
the court was unwilling to leave to Quinlan’s attending 
physicians full discretion to decide whether or not to 
continue a presumptively life-supporting respirator. 
The physicians had opted to continue life support in 
the face of a dismal neurological prognosis, but the 
court thought that this treatment violated her “right to 
die.” The attitude of the New Jersey court may be- 
speak a more general societal reluctance to allow physi- 
cians and families to make unsupervised decisions 
about levels of care for neurologically impaired pa- 
tients. The court did not cite any data showing that the 
traditional medical model has led to a systematic disre- 
gard of the interests of patients, and to this author’s 
knowledge no such data are available. Nevertheless, 
Quinlan and subsequent rulings reflect a judicial plush 
toward a more structured decision-making process 
r3 11. 
Substituted Judgment Models 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW. To protect what it deemed 
a constitutional right to decline life-prolonging care, 
the New Jersey court in Qain/an prescribed a decision- 
makmg process that allows for a joint decision by phy- 
sician, family, and a hospital committee [23].  Thus, if a 
physician determines that a neurologically impaired pa- 
tient has “no reasonable possibility of regaining cogni- 
tion or sapience,” and a hospital committee agrees with 
this determination, a duly informed family member 
may act for the patient and authorize the physician to 
withdraw life-supporting measures. If this procedure is 
followed, none of the participants in the decision is 
subject to civil or criminal liability. Language in the 
Quinlan decision suggests that the hospital commit tee 
might consider ethical aspects of the decision to reduce 
care. But the overall tenor of the court’s opinion is t-hat 
the committee’s function is to verify the neurological 
prognosis, not engage in a debate on the ethics of re- 
ducing care. The Washington Supreme Court has ap- 
proved a similar procedure, envisioning that the com- 
mittee (“prognosis board”) will have a circumscribed 
role C271. A presidential commission has also recom- 
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mended a procedure that includes an institutional re- 
view mechanism [36]. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW. In a ruling by which it authorized 
caretakers of an incompetent adult to withhold treat- 
ment for an invariably fatal but perhaps briefly control- 
lable leukemia, the highest court of Massachusetts in- 
dicated that all decisions to withhold life-sustaining 
treatment from incompetent patients should be re- 
viewed by a court 161. Under the proposed procedure, 
a probate judge appoints a guardian ad litem for the 
patient, who investigates what form of treatment is in 
the “best interests” of the patient. The guardian then 
makes a report to the probate court and includes all 
arguments for continuing care. If the guardian recom- 
mends against life-prolonging treatment, then treat- 
ment can be withheld if, but only if, the probate judge 
concurs. The Delaware Supreme Court has proposed a 
similar approach 142). The asserted benefits of a judi- 
cial role are assurance of an adequate investigation of 
the medical facts and an “objective” decision [ S ] .  The 
implication is that a less formalistic approach may result 
in abuses of the interests of helpless persons, a notion 
that has evoked rather heated debates 15, 401. 
AUTONOMY MODEL. In its Storar decision 1281, New 
York‘s highest court rejected the doctrine of sub- 
stituted judgment as a basis for decision making. In two 
companion cases, the court approved removal of a res- 
pirator from a vegetative patient who, before the event 
causing his brain injury, had clearly expressed a wish 
not to have his life prolonged if he were ever so 
afflicted, but refused to order stopping of blood trans- 
fusions for a terminally ill and profoundly retarded can- 
cer patient whose preferences were unknowable. The 
thrust of these rulings is that there must be proof that 
the patient would want care reduced and that this proof 
cannot be supplied by the preferences of those pur- 
porting to act for the patient, be they physicians, family 
members, committees, or judges. Proof of the patient’s 
preferences must be “clear and convincing.” One form 
of proof is a carefully drawn “living will” or analogous 
document, but oral statements by the patient were ac- 
cepted as meeting this standard in Storar. 
The obvious limitation of this model is that it fails to 
cover the vegetative or  otherwise severely impaired 
patient who has not previously expressed a preference 
but whose caretakers all agree on the appropriateness 
of reducing care. In other words, protecting the auton- 
omy of the patient may result in what many would view 
as inhumane or extravagant applications of medical 
technology. While there is no certain resolution to this 
dilemma, courts have concluded that a physician is not 
duty-bound to sustain life in all hopelessly ill, severely 
impaired patients 14, 23, 291. Thus, if a physician de- 
termines that a patient is irreversibly vegetative, there 
j 
is arguably no legally enforceable duty to sustain 
vegetative functions, whether or not the patient’s pref- 
erences are known. 
Future Directions 
Legislative 
The goals of preserving the autonomy of patients and 
protecting caretakers who try to act in the patient’s best 
interests may perhaps be accomplished by legislation. 
One approach is a “living will” statute that authorizes 
physicians to reduce care in accordance with patients’ 
previously declared wishes and affords legal protection 
to physicians who follow these directions. Several 
states have such laws 1371, but their practical usefulness 
is uncertain, partly because of restrictive coverage or 
confusing draftsmanship 1121. Another approach is a 
statute that authorizes any competent person to em- 
power a designated family member or legal representa- 
tive to consent to reduction of care in specified circum- 
stances [38). Virginia has recently enacted such a law 
1451. Finally, legislation might simply make physicians 
immune from civil or criminal liability if their decisions 
to reduce care are made in good faith and in accordance 
with accepted standards of medical practice 171. This 
approach recognizes both the fiduciary aspects of the 
physician’s role and the need to comply with evolving 
professional standards (including duties to make careful 
diagnoses and prognoses, to obtain “informed consent” 
where possible, and to employ only those treatments 
appropriate to a patient’s condition). 
Jzldicial 
Whatever legislative developments occur, courts will 
remain active in this area. It may take several years 
before there is enough legislation to provide clear guid- 
ance on decisions to reduce care, and the legislation 
itself will undoubtedly require judicial interpretation in 
particular cases. Furthermore, the ethical, moral, and 
political issues inherent in decisions to reduce care are 
so sensitive that tidy legislative solutions are improb- 
able. Thus, courts will continue to define on a case-by- 
case basis when reducing care is lawful and how the 
decisions must be reached. In this regard, two pending 
cases are of special interest. One is In re Conroy Cl91, 
now on appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court. At 
issue is whether it is lawful to withhold feeding from an 
aged patient with severe untreatable dementia and ma- 
jor medical problems. The other is the “Baby Jane 
Doe” litigation [44, 461. At issue here is the scope of 
the federal government’s power to constrain decisions 
to withhold care by parents and physicians of neurolog- 
ically impaired children. This case is now before a fed- 
eral appeals court. 
Addendum 
Following submission of this article, the Department of 
Health and Human Services issued its new “Baby Doc” regu- 
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lations (Nondiscrimination on  the Basis of Handicap; Proce- 
dures and Guidelines Relating to  Health Care for Handi- 
capped Infants. Federal Register 49: 1622, Jan 1984). These 
are less intrusive than the initial proposed regulations and 
seek to  encourage hospitals to establish their own review 
procedures. The potential for federal investigations of alleged 
noncompliance remains, however. 
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